Abstract: This study is to our knowledge the first attempt to infer the consequences on productivity entailed by anticompetitive regulations in product and labor markets through their impacts on production prices and wages. Results are encouraging showing that changes in production prices and wages at country*industry levels are informative about the creation of rents impeding productivity in different ways and to different extents. A simulation based on these results and on OECD regulation indicators suggests that nearly all countries, in particular European countries, could expect sizeable gains in multifactor productivity over the years from an economic policy that would be able to reform product and labor market regulation practices.
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(wages) and capital (profits) depends on the bargaining power of labour directly influenced by labour market regulations. So, labour market regulations influence the rent sharing process but not the rent building one, and for this reason has no impact on production price.
Numerous papers have been devoted to the direct impact of product market imperfections and few papers have been devoted to their indirect impact. This paper is in the continuation of two previous studies (Bourlès et al., 2013, and Cette, Lopez and Mairesse, 2013) focusing only on the indirect impact of non-manufacturing regulations. Like these two studies, it relies on a country*industry panel and it is also based, but to a lesser degree and indirectly, on the unique information provided by the OECD regulation indicators. Thanks to its econometric analysis framework, this paper not only confirms but also greatly extends the scope of our two previous studies, notably in comparing the relative importance of the different channels.
According to estimation results, there are significant productivity impacts of each channel, the main being the indirect NMR impact.
This study is to our knowledge the first attempt to infer the consequences on productivity entailed by anticompetitive regulations in product and labor markets through their impacts on production prices and wages. Results are encouraging notwithstanding the great difficulties of the issues at stake and the intrinsic limitations of relying on a macroeconomic country*industry panel. A simulation based on these results suggests that nearly all countries, in particular European countries, could expect important gains in multifactor productivity over the years from an economic policy that would be able to implement the lightest industry and labor regulation practices.
Our estimates and simulations are based on huge hypotheses and for this reason our results must be consider with caution. In particular, the productivity impact of ambitious structural reform programs consisting in the adoption of the lightest regulation practices is large and should get confirmation from other analyses based on other approaches. Nevertheless, concerning their largest component, the indirect impact of non-manufacturing regulation changes, they are totally consistent with our previous two evaluations based on other methodologies (see Bourlès et al., 2013 , and Cette, Lopez and Mairesse, 2013). We can also remark that ambitious structural reform programs implemented in some countries over the last decades had even larger MFP impacts (see Bergeaud, Cette and Lecat, 2014).
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I. Introduction
An abundant literature investigates the productivity impacts of product and labor market imperfections -and of anticompetitive regulations affecting them (see Aghion and Howitt 2009 for a summary). This paper contributes to this literature. Its originality, broadening an idea already present in Askenazy, Cette and Maarek (2013) , is to infer the consequences on productivity entailed by anticompetitive regulations in product and labor markets through their impacts on production prices and wages. The second paper's main contribution is that we estimate simultaneously, through a consistent framework, the direct and indirect impacts of product market imperfections on productivity as well as the impact of labor market imperfections. The Diagram we present here is a good way to briefly explain this framework.
Diagram: Regression model and calibration relationships
The right part of the diagram outlines the regression model which is central to our analysis, while the left part represents the calibration relationships which help us validate its interpretation and perform simulation of the Multifactor Productivity (MFP) gains resulting from structural reforms of product and labor markets, as gauged by the OECD indicators for
Non-Manufacturing Regulations (NMR), Harmonized tariffs (HT) and Employment
Protection Legislation (EPL). The regression model assumes that product market 6 imperfections generate higher production prices and rents, which have direct and indirect impacts on MFP in manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. Direct impacts reflect diminishing incentives and efforts to improve efficiency and innovate for industries that can already charge high prices and benefit from rents. This is in particular the case of nonmanufacturing industries often protected from competition by product market regulations, but would also be the case of manufacturing industries if protected from foreign competition by high tariff barriers. Indirect impacts also reflect weaker efficiency and innovation incentives and efforts from "downstream" industries if the profits and rents they can generate are appropriated by "upstream" industries that have market power and can charge them high prices for the intermediate inputs they must use. Again this is often the case when the upstream industries are non-manufacturing.
The logic and assumptions of our model are similar for labor market imperfections than for the indirect impact of product market imperfections. Employment protection legislation, professional agreements and norms, shortage of qualified workers in number of industries, etc, contribute to higher wages. Higher wages tend to reduce profits and rents that can be appropriated by firms' owners and shareholders to the benefit of the workers, in particular high skill workers who have a stronger bargaining power than low skill workers. In turn, diminishing efficiency and innovation surplus can deter firms from making efforts to improve their efficiency and innovate, and thus have direct impacts on MFP.
It's worth underlining that an important hypothesis or our approach, which gets inspired from the idea from Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) , is that rents stem from the direct impact of product market anti-competitive regulations. The sharing of these rents between labour (wages) and capital (profits) depends on the bargaining power of labour directly influenced by labour market regulations. So, labour market regulations influence the rent sharing process but not the rent building one, and for this reason has no impact on production price. country*industry panel and it is also based, but to a lesser degree and indirectly, on the unique information provided by the OECD regulation indicators. Thanks to its econometric analysis framework, this paper not only confirms but also greatly extends the scope of our two previous studies, notably in comparing the relative importance of the different channels.
Section 2 describes our country*industry panel data sample, defines our six impact indicators of production prices and wages, and discuss the specification of our regression model. Section 3 gives and comments our main estimation results, while section 4 presents a policy evaluation of the productivity impacts of structural reforms of product and labor market regulations based on these results. Section 5 is a short conclusion.
II. Sample, variables and regression model
Our analysis is grounded on an unbalanced country*industry*year panel data sample covering fourteen OECD countries and eighteen industries: thirteen mainly in "Manufacturing" and five mainly in "Non-Manufacturing". For lack of data for several country and/or sector in the earlier years, it is relatively unbalanced ranging for each country*industry time series from 1987 to 2007 at maximum, 6 years at minimum and about 12 years in average. The fourteen countries are: Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United-Kingdom and the United States. For the sake of convenience, "Manufacturing" refers here to: food products, textiles, wood products, paper, chemicals products, non-metallic mineral products, metal products, machinery not elsewhere classified (n.e.c.), electrical equipment, transport equipment, manufacturing n.e.c., but also construction and hotels & restaurants; while "Non-Manufacturing" refers to: energy, transport & communication, retail distribution, banking services and professional services. Overall our panel data sample counts 2820 observations, excluding the United States taken as the country of reference to control in particular for unobserved technical change at the industry level in our analysis. where in addition to the six impact price and wage indicators just defined, the log USA multifactor productivity for industry i and year (t-1) 23 ( ()) is included to mainly control for exogenous technical change at the industry level, choosing the USA which is at the world productivity frontier in most industries as an appropriate reference country for our analysis. Note that since the estimated elasticities of the indicators based on low and medium skill wages were not statistically different, we prefer to pull them together for more precision in our econometric analysis, and we refer to them for brevity simply as low skill wage indicator.
ours in order to control for distinctive country, industry or period characteristics, which could affect the estimates of the parameters of interest. 4 and 4 stand for two way countryindustry and country-year fixed effects.
Including the country-industry fixed effects 4 in our regression implies that the evidence on which we rely for estimation is only based on the within country*industry changes over time of our price and wage indicators; in the present context it is a necessity since these indicators are indices equal to 1 in the reference year 2000. Including the country*year fixed effects 4 is a useful precaution protecting from a variety of sources of potential estimation biases, in particular differences in country multifactor productivity not related to product or labor market imperfections (and not captured by the presence of 23 ), and endogeneity biases due to changes in prices and wages in response to country productivity shocks. It is also possible to substitute industry*year fixed effects 4 to 23 to control more fully for industry technical changes and other variation in industry multifactor productivity that are unrelated to product or labor market imperfections. As discussed in Cette, Lopez and
Mairesse (2013), we can view the regression results obtained when including only 4 or both 4 and 4 as providing respectively upper and lower bound estimates, with some preference for the upper estimates. We will only consider them here, but we present the two types of estimates in Appendix C (Table C1 ). In spite of the inherent difficulties and uncertainties of our analysis, the estimates of the six prices and wages elasticities obtained in the two cases appear fairly robust overall, all six being negative as expected and three out of the six being not statistically different at the 5% or 10% confidence level.
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III. Estimation results
Besides the controls for fixed effects in our regression, we also rely on the Dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimator rather than on the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator in order to make sure that the estimated elasticities are not biased by short term correlations between the variables and the idiosyncratic error 5 , and that they can be considered as long term 6 The estimated elasticities are smaller for _ , _ and _ when we control for both 4 and 4 than when we only control for 4 . This can be accounted by the fact that the reduction in variability in these indicators is much more important than for the other three indicators, when we control for 4 and even more for both 4 .and 4 . See analysis of variance in Table A1 and A2 in Appendix A.
parameters. 7 Our estimates are given in Table 1 , in the last column for the full specification of the regression (i.e. written as (1) in the previous section), and in the columns before for simpler specifications where the direct and indirect production price indicators and the wage indicators are introduced each in turn and pulling manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries together (i.e. overall industries). The DOLS estimator includes in the regression first-differences of explanatory variables as well as leads and lags of these first-differences. We have found enough to keep one lead and one lag. The OLS and DOLS estimates of all elasticities are in fact quite close (See Table C1 in Appendix C), but the Hausman test performed concludes to the bias of the OLS estimator.
We can see that the estimated elasticities for all the indicators are negative and statistically significant, and practically not affected, or only slightly, by the presence of the other ones. We observe nonetheless that the non-manufacturing industry component appears much larger than for the manufacturing industry component: twice for the direct price indicator (about 0.8 versus 0.4) and even up to ten times for the indirect price indicators (about 5.0 versus 0.5).
The same observation is true for the wage indicator: the high skill component is not far from being twice the low skill component (3.0 versus 1.7).
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IV. Simulation of potential impact of structural reforms
Although the estimated elasticities of our production price and wage indicators appear quite satisfactory, being of the expected sign, statistically significant and reasonably robust, we cannot directly interpret them in terms of the impacts on productivity of anticompetitive regulations in the product and labor markets, and in particular we cannot illustrate their implications in terms of potential impacts of structural reforms in these markets. Despite the particular care we have taken to control for errors of specification in our regression model as well as the consistency of our estimates, it is also good to confirm externally our interpretation that they indeed indirectly capture the impacts of regulations and not mainly some other economic factors. We can do both by estimating calibration relationships between the country*industry series of production prices and wages and the OECD indicators, providing a direct link to regulations and policy, namely the Non-Manufacturing Regulations (NMR) indicators, the Harmonized tariffs (HT) indicators for the manufacturing industries and the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indicators for the low and high skill wages.
These indicators are based on very detailed information on laws, rules and market, country and industry settings, and they have the advantage to be to exogenous to productivity developments and directly related to underlying policies, at least to a major extent. Note also that the elasticities are very precisely estimated for _ , _ and _ but somewhat less so for _ , _ and particularly for _ , which are also the three much larger. The reason is likely the same that explains that the elasticity estimates for these three indicators are much reduced when we control for both 4 and 4 (see footnote 5).The reduction in their variability is much more important than for the other three indicators, already when we control for 4 and even more for both 4 and 4 , as shown by the analysis of variance in Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A.
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In order to be congruent with our regression model, the calibration relations can be simply estimated as four OLS projections: two on NMR and HT indicators for manufacturing and non-manufacturing production prices respectively, and two on EPL indicators for low and high skill wages. The projection coefficients estimates we find corroborate that the correlations between changes in production prices and wages and changes in the OECD regulation indicators are positive and statistically significant. These results are documented in details in Table C2 Appendix C. Two OLS projections for production prices are conditional on all the fixed effects also included in our regression model, but the two ones for wages can only be conditional on country and year fixed effects since the wages series are only available at the country level. The three estimated calibration coefficients for manufacturing and service industries production prices and for low skill wages are statistically very significant (at a 1% confidence level), but the fourth one for high skill wages is only weakly significant (at a 10% confidence level).
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Note that, although the USA is taken as the reference country and excluded from our estimation sample, we have included it in the simulation and in definition of lightest practices, thus extending to this country the average estimates obtained for the thirteen countries kept in the sample. Note also that unlike the NMR and EPL indicators updated for the year 2013, the most recent HT indicator available is for the year 2008, and we have simply assumed it had not changed in 2013. Indeed, the industry total compensation of low skill workers is always higher than for high skill workers (two times higher on average) and the projection coefficient of wages on EPL indicators is about three times higher for low skill wages than for high skill wages.
We have also complemented our analysis by another policy simulation of the MFP gains that could be expected from the reduction of NMR and EPL regulations during the period 2007-2012 (but not of HT regulations, information on these indicators being unavailable after 2008). This ex-post simulation (presented in Appendix E) shows that the MFP gains attributable in the long term to these reductions are of about 0.6% on average and are mainly due to reforms on product markets, with the higher gains for Italy (2.0%).
V. To conclude
This study is to our knowledge the first attempt to infer the consequences on productivity in Australia, Canada and Sweden, the MFP growth increased in these four countries for at least 1 percentage point in average over the next ten years compared to the previous ten years.
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Historical country experiences seem to give a strong confirmation to our results. Nevertheless, as told before, we do no comment in our analysis institutional and political difficulties of the implementation of such ambitious structural reform programs. We can only observe that the four country examples evoked before were knowing high economic difficulties before the implementation of their reform programs.
APPENDIX A: RELATION (1) DATA
This appendix presents data sources of and calculation methods required to mobilize relation Capital stocks are calculated from investment data using the permanent inventory method and assuming constant geometric rates of depreciation: 5% for non-residential structures, 10% for non-ICT equipment, 20% for ICT equipments and 25% for R&D. In order to compute investments in constant prices, we have used investment deflators at the national level.
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To ease the presentation, 'Construction' and 'Hotels and Restaurants' industries are included into the 'manufacturing' group.
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Because of the lack of specific price information for R&D, we have used as a proxy the manufacturing production deflator. To improve comparability, we have assumed for all countries that the ratio of investment prices over the GDP price is the same as for the USA for the ICT investments in hardware, software and telecommunications equipment. Indeed, the USA is by far the country that most extensively relies on hedonic methods to measure these prices.
Data on value added and employment come from the OECD STAN dataset, data on R&D expenses from the ANBERD OECD dataset and data on other product investment from the EUKLEMS dataset. Since R&D is not yet treated as in investment in the national accounts data gathered by OECD, we had to correct both the industry value added by adding ("expensing out") the intermediate consumption of their R&D activities and the industry number of employees by subtracting the number of R&D personnel (to avoid "double counting"). Note also that we had to modify the price index of value added, and hence its value in constant price, for the "Electrical and optical equipment" industry, which includes communication and computing equipment. In the same way as for the ICT investment, we assumed that in this industry the ratio of value added prices over the GDP price is the same in all countries as for the USA. A u s t r i a C a n a d a D e n m a r k F i n l a n d F r a n c e G e r m a n y I t a l y J a p a n N e t h e r l a n d s S p a i n S w e d e n U n i t e d K i n g d o m U n i t e d S t a t e s
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Upstream burden indicators
Our empirical investigation mobilizes industry relative production prices (i.e. production prices over the GDP price) and real wages as indexes of market regulations. Data on production prices come from the OECD STAN dataset and data on wages by skills from the EUKLEMS dataset.
Chart A3 shows the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sample average annual growth rates of relative production prices. These prices have decreased in most countries, likely because prices of public services -as they are measured by national accounting services -are growing faster than the other parts of GDP. There are important relative production price growth differences across countries. Chart A4 shows the sample average annual growth rate of real wages for high skills and low skills workers. The real wage increases are almost the same on average for the two worker's groups. As for the relative production prices, there are important real wage growth differences across countries.
Chart A3
Sample average annual growth of relative production prices Relative production prices are the ratio of industry production prices over GDP price If government reacts to the aggregate economic situation by changing the regulations, the country*year fixed effects will offset the corresponding endogeneity biases, as in a differencein-difference approach. Moreover, it is important to stress that country*year fixed effects can act as good proxies for a variety of omitted variables. In particular they can take into account differences between countries in technical progress, in the development of labor force education and skills, and in changes in international trade conditions, in cyclical position, etc… In the same way, industry*year fixed effects could take into account differences between industries. However, our main estimates omit these fixed effects. This section explains our choice.
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Although EUKLEMS provide time series of average wages at the country*industry level for low, medium and high skill levels, we could not rely on them since once we control for the appropriate fixed effects to be included in our analysis (see regression (1) below) their remaining variability appears very small and particularly noisy. We thus chose to rely on time series of wages at the country level interacted with labor cost shares at the industry level. In spite of the fact that their remaining variability is also very small, we obtain with them more reliable and reasonable estimates. Table A1 summarizes the results of a variance analysis of relation (1) variables on the full set of possible fixed effects. Each column presents the residual standard-deviation of the regressions of each variable on a set of fixed effects. For the first column, the regression includes the minimum set of fixed effects: country, industry and country*industry fixed effects (these fixed effects are required as price levels are not comparable across countries and industries). Thus, column (1) shows the dispersion of the within 'individual' changes of the variables values and column (2) and (3) show how much of this variability would be taken into account when other fixed effects are included. As first differences are maybe easier to interpret, Table A2 shows the variance analysis of relation (1) variables first differences.
14 Column (1) of Table A2 shows the standard-deviation of the variables first differences, while columns (2) and (3) gives them after controlling respectively for country*year fixed effects and both country*year and industry*year fixed effects. According to both tables, the standarddeviations of some variables are relatively small, particularly the upstream burden indicators of the non-manufacturing relative production prices and the wage burden indicators.
Moreover, these standard-deviation are reduced significantly when controlling for country*year and industry*year fixed effects. Therefore, we prefer to omit the industry*year fixed effects in our main estimates.
14 Note that when using the first difference estimator rather than the within industry-country changes, but still controlling for country*year fixed effects, the estimated relation (1) coefficients are not qualitatively different but sometimes smaller and with higher coefficient standard-deviation and thus not statistically significant. Observations 2820 2820 2820 *The variability in (;<= >? ) is necessarily null when controlling for industry*year fixed effects. Columns (1), (2) and (3) give the standard deviations of the variables after controlling for fixed effects. Column (1) gives the standard deviations of the first difference of the variables, while columns (2) and (3) gives them after controlling respectively for country*year fixed effects and both country*year and industry*year fixed effects.
28
APPENDIX B: OECD REGULATION INDICATORS
We assume that relative production prices and real wages are indexes of product and labor 
APPENDIX C: ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
This appendix evaluates the robustness of our estimations to three assumptions: (i) the fixed effect list choice; (ii) the use of the Dynamic OLS estimator; and (iii) the assumption that production prices and real wages are indexes of product and labor market imperfections.
Estimator and fixed effects sensitivity analysis Relation (1) includes country, industry, country*industry and year fixed effects to take into account of omission bias otherwise possible, but no industry*year fixed. Industry*year fixed effects could take into account industry specific omitted variables, notably technical change, but to introduce these last fixed effects would lead to explain almost all the variability of many relation (1) variables (see the variance analysis in appendix A). Table C1 shows the estimation results when these fixed effects are included (columns 3 and 4) and when they are omitted (columns 1 and 2, corresponding to columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 ).
The introduction of industry*year fixed effects leads to a reduction of the absolute value of every coefficients. This reduction doesn't change qualitatively the results when we focus on all industries and all workers. When we distinguish the impact of manufacturing and nonmanufacturing production prices and of high and low skill real wages, the coefficients of the upstream non-manufacturing burden indicator and of the low skill wages burden indicator are no more statistically significant. The lack of data variability may explain these results.
However the main estimates (columns 1 and 2) for these variables should be taken with caution.
These estimations mobilize the Dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimator in order to take into account of possible simultaneity between the non-stationary variables. Table C1 shows also the robustness of the estimation results to the use of the OLS estimator (columns 5 and 6). The results are very close to the DOLS estimates. However, according to a Hausman test the OLS estimates are not consistent, so we prefer to use the DOLS estimates. 
Estimated impact of regulations on production prices
We estimate the relations of relative production prices and real wages with OECD regulation The policy simulations presented in section 4 give economic significance to the estimated coefficient of Table C2 . According to these simulations, a switch to the lightest practices would imply, on average and on long-term, a 1.71% decrease of production prices (1.23% from the NMR reforms and 0.48% from the HT reforms), a real wage decrease of 2.00% for the high skill workers and of 5.73% for the low skill workers.
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APPENDIX D: SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT, AN ERROR CORRECTION MODEL
DOLS estimates of relation (1) (Table 1) provide the long-term impact of relative production prices and real wages on MFP. In the same way, Table C2 presents the long-term relations of relative production prices and real wages with the OECD regulation indicators. However, it is interesting in term of policy recommendations to evaluate the speed of adjustment to these long-term effects. This appendix presents estimates of this speed of adjustment.
The speed of adjustment is estimated in two steps. This difference would be equal to the residual of the long-term estimation if we use the OLS estimator. However, as we use the DOLS estimator this no longer true. 
